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The Case for the Four Component
Model vs. Moral Foundations
Theory: A Perspective from
Moral Psychology
by Elizabeth C. Vozzola*
The 2016 Mercer Law Review Symposium asked speakers to address
some aspect of three organizing questions about educational interventions designed to cultivate professional identity in law students. The
Symposium's first proposed question of whether it is worthwhile to establish such interventions seemed largely rhetorical. The third question
asked about appropriate assessment of such interventions and will be
addressed in this issue by leaders in the field of legal ethics and professional program assessment. Hence, as a teacher and psychologist whose
primary role in the field has been to synthesize theory and research, I
chose to question the second guiding question with its assumption that,
if a decision was made to attempt an educational intervention, then
James Rest and colleagues' Four Component Model of Morality (FCM)1
should guide curricular goals.
Accordingly, this Article aims to provide a brief overview of the rich
and varied landscape of the field of moral psychology with a specific focus
on the current debate about how much of a role actual conscious reasoning and deliberation plays in moral decisions and consequent actions. The

*Professor, Department of Psychology, University of Saint Joseph. Marian College
(B.A., 1980); Winona State University (M.S., 1984); Fordham University (M.A., 1992); Fordham University (Ph.D., 1994).
1. James R. Rest, Morality, in 3 HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY: COGNITIVE
DEVELOPMENT 556 (Paul H. Mussen, John H. Flavell & Ellen M. Markman eds., 4th ed.
1983). The Four Component Model was updated in 1999 to better reflect the authors' current thinking about schema theory. See JAMES R. REST, DARCIA NARVAEZ, MURIEL J.
BEBEAU & STEPHEN THOMA, POSTCONVENTIONAL MORAL THINKING: A NEO-KOHLBERGIAN

APPROACH (1999).
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FCM, while acknowledging the role of the intuitive and emotional reactions central to the new theory on the block, Jonathan Haidt's Moral
Foundations Theory (MFT), 2 still privileges the kind of thoughtful moral
deliberation that Haidt argues rarely actually occurs. I will argue that
given the goals of legal education and practice, such privileging makes a
great deal of sense. Secondly, however, I argue that while encouraging
ethical professional identity through the lens of the FCM may be an excellent fit for a law school curriculum, we do students a real disservice if
we do not also help them to understand both our evolutionarily pre-attuned propensity to make rapid, intuitive evaluations heavily influenced
by cultural norms and our dark and dangerous capacity for moral disengagement.
My interest in exploring MFT's potential challenge to the FCM as an
emerging dominant moral paradigm arose this summer while serving on
the dissertation committee for a young Psy.D candidate. He asked for
input on good measures for his key dependent variable, moral reasoning.
I gave him several options with a strong recommendation to consider the
Defining Issues Test (DIT),3 a widely used, reliable, and valid instrument
for measuring moral reasoning complexity that was developed and revised by the same team that developed and updated the FCM. To my
surprise, the young man instead decided to use the Moral Foundations
Questionnaire (MFQ)4 underlying Haidt's work as he believed it better
captured the kind of intuitive moral reasoning prevalent among his sample of emerging adult participants in a somewhat impetuous and relatively non-reflective stage of life.
To explore whether the young scholar's decision represented an anomaly or a trend, I worked with a reference librarian to see just how widespread the move from the field's reliance on the FCM and the DIT to the

2. See Jonathan Haidt, The EmotionalDog and its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist
PSYCHOL. REV. 814 (2001); JONATHAN HAIDT, THE

Approach to Moral Judgment, 108

RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION (2012);

&

Jesse Graham, Jonathan Haidt, Sena Koleva, Matty Motyl, Ravi Jyer, Sean P. Wojcik
Peter H. Ditto, Moral FoundationsTheory: The PragmaticValidity of Moral Pluralism, in
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 47, 55-130 (2012).
3. One of the best resources for information on the DIT is the website of the Center
for the Study of Ethical Development at the University of Alabama which describes the test
and gives information on ordering as well as providing links to Bebeau's materials on assessment materials for other components of the FCM. THE UNIV. OF ALA. CTR. FOR THE
STUDY OF ETHICAL DEv., http://ethicaldevelopment.ua.edu (last visited Nov. 29, 2016).
4. The Moral Foundations website provides a brief background on MFT as well as
links to the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) and relevant articles and videos,
MORAL FOUNDATIONS THEORY, http://www.moralfoundations.org (last visited Nov. 29,
2016). Students can take the online MFQ survey and immediately see their profile of preferences for the six moral foundations.
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new MFT and MFQ model. In our brief survey of Google Scholar citations
from 2010-2016, we found 345 citations for the FCM, 285 for the DIT and
12,000 (many heavily cited) for the MFT. Might law schools wanting to
develop psychologically informed curricula be looking at instituting dial
up when the world has moved on to high-speed wireless?
I will answer that question by first providing context about relevant
key ideas shaping contemporary developmental and moral psychology.
The next section of the paper reviews insights gleaned from a review of
recent psychologically informed articles about teaching legal ethics and
professional identity formation. The penultimate section provides a comparative analysis of the case for the FCM versus MFT before ending with
thoughts on practical applications of moral development theory to educational interventions that might best cultivate professional identity in law
students.
I. RELEVANT CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

Currently, the field of moral development sits somewhat uneasily in a
time between paradigms. A core of experienced researchers still sees
great value in the cognitive developmental model inherent in the FCM,
but most scholars acknowledge the need to accommodate the model to
new findings from fields such as evolutionary and biological psychology,
personality psychology, cultural psychology, and social psychology. To be
overly simplistic, developmental and personality psychologists, like FCM
theorist James Rest, have tended to focus on peoples' individual traits
and abilities and changes across time and experience. In contrast, social
psychologists like Jonathan Haidt focus on the influence of other people
and situations on thoughts, attitudes, and behavior. I will summarize
several key concepts influencing theory and research in the field before
turning to the case for integrating both the FCM and MFT models into
law school education interventions.
A. Biological/EvolutionaryPerspectives on Morality
Exploration of the influence of evolutionary pre-attunement and the
biological underpinnings of psychological phenomena constitutes a major
trend in psychology today.
Of particular relevance to the question of rational versus intuitive reasoning, Daniel Kahneman 5 profoundly influenced psychological science

5. Kahneman's work on thinking fast and thinking slow not only informs Haidt's theory but also provides a rationale for bridging the potential tensions between the FCM and
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with his concept of two distinct modes of thinking. System 1 thinking
developed "earlier in evolutionary time and provided our ancestors with
an automatic, fast, and unconscious process for making quick decisions
and taking decisive actions."6 Despite its advantages for physical survival, the heuristics developed to simplify decision-making can also lead
to biased thinking. In contrast, System 2 thinking "developed later in human history and ... tends to be controlled, slow, and conscious." 7 System
2 is "rational, analytic, explicit, and rule based"8 and allows us to consider
possibilities, and to monitor and, if necessary, override quick emotional
decisions made using System 1. As part of teaching students to "think
like a lawyer," law schools put strong emphasis on honing System 2's analytical thinking skills.
Time and space limitations preclude an in-depth review of the prolific
scholarship into the neurological and evolutionary underpinnings of morality. However, it is important to note that in addition to Kahneman's
work on two systems of thinking and Jonathan Haidt's MFT, Franz De
Waal's work with primate reciprocity,9 and Darcia Narvaez's theory of
Triune Ethics10 have broadened our understanding of morality and moral
reasoning.
B. PersonalityPsychology-Moral Self/Personality/Identity
Many theorists and researchers see the concept of moral self, or the
extent to which moral values and ideals are central to one's identity, as
providing important explanatory insights into both moral behavior and
moral motivation. In short, you will be motivated to do the right thing if

MFT. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality, 58(9) AM. PSYCHOL. 697
(2003).
6.

ELIZABETH VOZZOLA, MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 61 (2014).

Kahneman's work is set in the context of the rise of new theories from neuroscience and
evolutionary perspectives. Id. at 61-62.
7. Id. at 62.
8. Id.
9.

See FRANS DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED: THE ORIGINS OF RIGHT AND WRONG IN

HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS (1996); Frans de Waal, Moral Behavior in Animals, TED
(Nov. 2011), www.ted.com/talks/frans-de waaldoanimals-have-morals.html.
10. For a comprehensive and interdisciplinary treatment of the relationship between
neurobiology and human morality as well as an in-depth explanation of her Triune Ethics
Theory, see DARCIA NARVAEZ, NEUROBIOLOGY AND
MORALITY: EVOLUTION, CULTURE, AND WISDOM (2014).

THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN
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not doing so threatens your view of yourself as a good, ethical person.' 1 I
will return to this concept in the discussion of the FCM.

C. CulturalPsychology -WEIRD
Although the overwhelming majority of psychology publications are
still generated in Western countries, often on convenience samples of 1822 year old college students, the past decades have brought increasing
attention to the need to integrate cross-cultural findings into our understanding of human behavior, especially morality.1 2 Although people
raised in Western cultures make up only 12% of the world's population,
they make up 96% of the participants in top psychology journals.1 3 That
discrepancy is highlighted in the acronym WEIRD (Western, Educated,
Industrial, Rich, Democratic) introduced in the influential 2010 article
"The Weirdest People in the World."1 4 Recent research suggests that
many findings long presumed to be universal (for example, such as categorization, motivation, and moral reasoning) show significant cultural
differences.

D. Moral Disengagement
Albert Bandura believes people use numerous psychological mechanisms selectively to disengage from inhumane unethical conduct. 1s
Briefly, to disengage from reprehensible conduct, we use (1) moral justification (linking actions to socially worthy purposes or moral causes such
as preserving democracy); (2) advantageous or palliative comparison
(comparing the temporary terror of water boarding prisoners to the agony
of World Trade Center victims who burned alive); and (3) euphemistic

11. For an excellent introduction to the work of major researchers in the field of moral
personality,

see PERSONALITY, IDENTITY, AND CHARACTER: EXPLORATIONS IN MORAL

PSYCHOLOGY (Darcia Narvaez & Daniel K. Lapsley eds., 2009), noting especially Augustus
Blasi, The Moral Functioningof Mature Adults and the Possibility of FairMoral Reasoning,
in PERSONALITY, IDENTITY, AND CHARACTER: EXPLORATIONS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 396-

440 (Darcia Narvaez & Daniel K. Lapsley eds., 2009).
12. Haidt's MFT relies heavily on the theory and research of cultural anthropologist
Richard Shweder. See RICHARD A. SHWEDER, THINKING THROUGH CULTURES: EXPEDITIONS

IN CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY (1991). For a fine collection of more recent work that attempts
to bridge concepts of cultural and developmental psychology, see BRIDGING CULTURAL AND
DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACHES TO PSYCHOLOGY: NEW SYNTHESIS IN THEORY, RESEARCH

AND POLICY (Lene Arnett Jensen ed., 2011).
13. Joseph Heinrich, Steven Heine, Ara Norenzayan, The Weirdest People in the World?
33 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN SCI. 63 (2010).

14. Id. at 61-83.
15. Albert Bandura, Selective Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency,
31(2) J. MORAL EDUC. 101 (2002).
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labeling ("collateral damage" rather than dead women and children). 16 To
morally disengage from the detrimental effects of actions, people use
minimizing, ignoring, disregarding, distorting, or misconstruing.17 Finally, to morally disengage from our victims, we use dehumanization (labeling others as "gooks," "losers," or "cockroaches") and attributions of
blame ("I was driven to lying about the evidence because so many criminals walk on a technicality."). 18
E. Social Psychology
As Haidt's MFT relies heavily on social psychology research on implicit/intuitive versus explicit/rational thinking to support the existence
of the posited moral foundations; I will leave further discussion of this
trend to the analysis of that theory. But first, I would like to turn from
the major ideas of moral psychology to relevant ones in legal ethics.
II. MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND LEGAL ETHICS/
PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY FORMATION

The invitation to participate in this conference sent me on a crash
course to learn about the big ideas in the field of legal ethics and professional identity formation. Several thinkers provided useful perspectives
for this Article's argument for integrating theoretical models.
As evidenced by the numerous citations of her work and ideas I came
across in my literature review, Mickey Bebeau's outstanding work in
moral development theory and research, coupled with her expertise in
professional ethics education and the assessment of ethics curricula has
made her a leading expert on the FCM's application to ethics education. 19
Bebeau and Monson'S 20 work on the importance of guiding practice by
theory and grounding interventions in evidence holds particular relevance for the guiding questions of this conference and as well as for anyone designing courses and environments that promote and support ethical development and professionalism.

16. Id. at 102-06.
17. Id. at 108.
18. Id. at 108-10.
19. Among many useful articles, see especially a recent update to prior descriptions of
assessment strategies and teaching techniques to promote FCM abilities: Muriel J. Bebeau,
An Evidence-Based Guide for Ethics Instruction, 15(12) J. MICROBIOLOGY & BIOLOGY EDUC.
124 (2014).
20. Muriel J. Bebeau & Verna E. Monson, Guided by Theory, Grounded in Evidence:A
Way Forward to Professional Ethics Education, 557-82 in HANDBOOK OF MORAL AND
CHARACTER EDUCATION (Larry Nucci & Darcis Narvaez eds., 2008).
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Moving more specifically to the field of legal ethics, Alice Woolley 21
provides an excellent analysis of how theories of legal ethics can be understood in terms of three broad categories based on their stance on the
relationship between morality and the law. The standard form "understand[s] the lawyer's ethical duties in terms of ... entitlements of citizens
relative to a system of law." 22 In short, within the constraints of professional ethics, lawyers' primary duty is to maximize clients' chances of
winning their case. Another category of theories critiques the standard
role conception and argues that lawyers are ethically bound by the law's
morality. The third perspective believes we must judge lawyers' actions
"against the requirements of ordinary morality." 23 As a consequence of
this theoretical diversity, law students may legitimately wonder whether
to approach ethical dilemmas through the "lens of loyalty to clients, fidelity to law or with an emphasis on the overarching claims of ordinary
morality." 24
Woolley's article led me to David Luban's influential 2007 work, Legal
Ethics and Human Dignity.25 Although Woolley holds that all three categories of legal ethics theories represent the highest form of moral reasoning, post-conventional thinking, and are thus "equivalent as forms of
moral reasoning," 26 reading Luban's work suggested that only theories of
ordinary morality that allow lawyers to use the rule of law to promote
and protect human dignity actually represent the conception of post conventional thinking used in moral development.
Other relevant articles that evidenced both psychological sophistication and practical usefulness include those by Neil Hamilton, Jerome Organ, and Verna Monson 27 on ethical professionalism formation and Alice

21. Alice Woolley, The Problem of Disagreement in Legal Ethics Theory, 26 CANADIAN
J. L. & JURIs. 181 (2013).
22. Id. at 181.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 182.
25.

DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY (2007). For David Luban, the

standard conception of lawyer's roles or neutral partisanship can lead to rationalizing violations of common morality. Many of his examples could also be understood in terms of
Bandura's concept of moral disengagement. See id.
26. Woolley, supra note 21, at 183.
27. See, e.g., Neil Hamilton & Verna Monson, The Positive Empirical Relationship of
Professionalismto Effectiveness in the Practiceof Law, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 137 (2010);
Neil W. Hamilton & Verna E. Monson, Ethical Professionalism(Trans) Formation:Themes
from Interviews with Lawyers about Professionalismand Exemplary Lawyers, 52(3) SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 921 (2012); Neil W. Hamilton, Verna E. Monson & Jerome M. Organ, Empirical Evidence that Legal Education Can Foster Student Professionalism/Professional
Formationto Become an Effective Lawyer, 10 UNIV. ST. THOMAs L.J. 11 (2012).
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Woolley on intuition and theory in teaching legal ethics. 28 Given that so
many of these thinkers make a compelling case for using the FCM to
shape and assess professional ethics course, we come to a logical segue
into the theory itself.
III. THE CASE FOR THE FOUR-COMPONENT MODEL

As a relatively young science, Psychology is not only theoretically diverse but also constantly evolving, with new paradigms challenging and
often replacing older ones. In Developmental Psychology we have
watched the grand stage theories of giants like Freud, Piaget, Erikson
and Kohlberg challenged by perspectives from feminist, cultural, and
evolutionary psychology. In the sub-field of moral psychology, many of
the senior researchers came out of a cognitive developmental perspective
rooted in ideas of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg described six stages of increasingly logical and adequate moral reasoning
that develop across the lifespan. A relatively small number of people
achieve the pinnacle of moral reasoning, the ability to make post-conventional judgments that balance the rights and responsibilities of all concerned parties in any moral dilemma and evidence an attitude of mutual
29
respect and commitment to universal principles.
Kohlberg's theory revolutionized the field and led to an explosion of
research and interventions but, ultimately, also to problems we call the
judgment/action gap. The possibility that one could attain Kohlberg's
30
highest stage of moral reasoning but "remain a bastard" led James Rest
to posit that moral behavior could not be understood by moral reasoning
alone. Rather it was influenced by four separate components, all of which
31
play important roles when we face ethical dilemmas. Law professors
interested in designing professional ethics courses around the goals of
the FCM will find Hamilton and Monson's overview of the current NeoKolhlbergian Four Component Model in relation to professional develop32
ment particularly well-articulated.

28. Alice Woolley, Intuition and Theory in Legal Ethics Teaching, 9 UNIV. ST. THOMAS
L.J. 285 (2011).
29. For an overview and evaluation of Kohlberg's theory, see VozzOLA, MORAL
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 26-34.
30. Roger Straughan, Why Act on Kohlberg's Moral Judgments? (Or How to Reach
Stage 6 and Remain a Bastard), in 4 MORAL DEVELOPMENT: A COMPENDIUM 169-77 (Bill
Puka ed., 1994).
31. JAMES R. REST, MORAL DEVELOPMENT: ADVANCES IN RESEARCH AND THEORY
(1986).
32. Hamilton & Monson, Professionalism(Trans) Formation, supra note 27.
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1. Component 1/Moral Sensitivity involves an awareness of how
an individual is affecting others and the ability to code a situation as
involving moral issues. Since effective practice of the law requires both
perspective taking and empathy, in legal contexts, Hamilton and Monson
suggest referring "to moral sensitivity as Perceptual Clarity and Empathy." 33

2. Component 2/Moral Judgment requires "the ability to provide a
sound rationale for one's decision about a moral problem."34 As Hamilton

notes, Rest and his colleagues "reconceptualized moral judgment as
moral schemas, or mental maps, that shape how we perceive moral problems and reason about how to resolve [them]." 35 Neo-Kolbergian theory
thus moved away from Kohlberg's 6-stage theory to posit three increasingly complex schemas of moral reasoning relying on implicit processes
and tacit knowledge: 36
a. personal interests, meaning reasoning dominated by self-interest,
fear of authority, and lack of autonomy or personal responsibility;
b. maintainingnorms, or reasoning focused on existing norms, rules,
codes, and laws; and
c. post conventional, or reasoning involving concepts of justice, fairness, duty, and the evolutionary nature of morality in society. 37
3. Component 3/Moral Motivation and Commitment/Identity
Formation has often been defined as prioritizing moral values over
other considerations, but more recent definitions stress such prioritization as dependent on the formation of the moral self. Thus, the moral self
plays a key role in closing the judgment action gap between knowing the
right thing to do and actually doing it. "Professional identity formation
also involves weighing the obligation of the profession to society against
one's self-interest."3 8
4. Component 4/Moral Character/Moral Implementation (Conscience in Action-Interpersonal Abilities) rests on a person's moral character and actual competence to carry out a moral decision. Hamilton and
Monson quote Rest's explanation of implementation as involving the abil-

33. Id. at 146.
34. Id. at 147.
35. Id. at 147-48.
36. See VOZzOLA, MORAL DEVELOPMENT, supranote 6, at 34-40, for an overview of the
field of moral development's movement from stages to schemas.
37. Hamilton & Monson, Professionalism(Trans) Formation, supra note 27, at 148.
38. Id. at 149.
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ity to keep sight of a moral goal while figuring out specific necessary actions, working around potential impediments, and overcoming distractions and frustrations. 39
For decades, this model has been widely used in moral development
research despite the fact that only Component 2, Moral Judgment has a
widely used measure, the Defining Issues Test (DIT). The FCM fits three
major criteria for effective theories: comprehensiveness (applicable to
many diverse situations), parsimony (describing phenomena in the simplest way possible), and heuristic value (inspiring new research). In addition, it can claim decades of solid research findings supporting the existence of development in cognitive complexity across age and education.
In terms of addressing contemporary psychological challenges, the FCM
has been revised to incorporate new research on tacit rather than explicit
schemas; recognizes that the need to maintain a good image of the self
contributes to moral motivation; and explains cultural differences by noting, while cultures influence the content of moral reasoning, structures
40
measured by the DIT are universal.
Although widely respected in the field of moral development, the FCM
has also been challenged for its privileging of moral reasoning; an emphasis due in part to a lack of reliable and valid, widely accepted
measures of the other three components. In addition, the theoretical
ideas rely heavily on DIT research which some criticize as rooted in a
Western rather than universal conception of morality. However, in the
specific context of professional ethical education and identity formation,
the critique should be modified to acknowledge the presence of Bebeau
and associates' strong and promising assessment models for ethical sen4
sitivity and motivation. 1
Yet, I remain concerned about the difficulty of assessment given the
42
complexity of the evolving definitions of the components. Although most
conceptions of ethical sensitivity mention the importance of cultivating

39. Id. at 150.
40. See THE UNIVERSITY
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3.

OF

ALABAMA

CENTER FOR

THE

STUDY

OF

ETHICAL

41. Excellent materials are available at, Links to Bebeau's Materials, THE UNIV. OF
ALA.

CTR.

FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL DEV., http://ethicaldevelopment.ua.edufbebeau-m

aterials.html (last visited Nov.; 29, 2016).
42. An ambitious attempt to present current approaches and research about "what
drives, urges and impels humans to moral judging and acting" surveyed work of many
prominent researchers on moral motivation but failed to identify any genuine consensus on
its definition and assessment. Most relevant to this symposium's key questions is the fine
analysis by Stephen J. Thoma & Muriel J. Bebeau, Moral Motivation and the Four Component Model, in HANDBOOK OF MORAL MOTIVATION: THEORIES, MODELS, APPLICATIONS 4968 (Karin Heinrichs, Fritz Oser & Terence Lovat eds., 2013).
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empathy, I believe we also need to examine empathy's role in moral motivation. I have always found Component 3 to be so cognitive that it
moves away from our ordinary language conceptions of motivation as
something that causes us to act. I would argue that two of the most powerful moral motivators that move us from perceiving a moral issue to action are not cognitive privileging but rather empathy and faith.
I would also like to suggest a possible extension of our understanding
of ethical sensitivity in the context of law school education. In addition to
helping students understand the importance of empathy and role-taking
ability, it seems to me that ethical sensitivity for lawyers also rests on
the cultivation of moral habits rooted in the profession's ethical codes.
Ideally, law school training in formal ethical guidelines sensitizes students such that they more easily perceive (to use Hamilton's term) the
presence of a moral issue because they now have readily accessible ethical schemas.
However, if lawyers' training prioritizes the standard role for ethical
practice, there may be great potential for moral disengagement. Luban
has critiqued the standard role's use of zealous advocacy regardless of
possible harm or suffering to people other than a client4 3-a position that
seems quite relevant to efforts to cultivate (and assess) moral sensitivity.
For example, a highly principled attorney friend, a former public defender in a major city, is now dedicated to promoting the cause of restorative justice. However, she was perplexed when asked if it did not concern her that when she defended someone who had just told her "Yeah, I
raped her," the person might go out and rape again. She answered, "No,
it's my job to defend my client to the best of my ability, beyond that, I
trust in the legal process." Her response fits well with Woolley's second
category of being bound by the law's morality44 but might be viewed as

quite problematic from the standpoint of ordinary morality.
IV. THE CASE FOR MORAL FOUNDATIONS THEORY

With his popular TED talks, website, book and articles, social psychologist Jonathan Haidt has emerged as the public voice of a group of
social and cultural psychologistS 4 5 who challenge the Neo-Kohlbergians'

43. Luban, supranote 25.
44. Woolley, supranote 21.
45. In addition to the Moral Foundations website and books and article previously mentioned, see also Haidt's popular TED talks: Jonathan Haidt, The Moral Roots of Liberals
and Conservatives, TED (Feb. 2008), http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan-haidton-themoral_mind?language=en; Jonathan Haidt, Religion, Evolution, and the Ecstasy of Selftranscendence, TED (Feb. 2012), https://www.ted.com/talks/jonathanhaidt-humanity
_s.stairway to_selftranscendence.
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belief that cognition is the best way to understand how people make sense
of the world. Instead, Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) proposes that
humans possess six, possibly more, innate psychological systems that
constitute intuitive ethical foundations.
In his widely reviewed and discussed book The Righteous Mind: Why

Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion,46 Haidt makes a series

of bold assertions about morality.
1. Intuition, not reason drives our moral judgments.
2. Morality both binds us and blinds us.
3. Evolution has etched into our brains a set of psychological foundations that underlie the virtues seen in cultures around the world.
4. Although all humans are prewired with the same six foundations,
cultures teach us which ones to prioritize and prize.
5. Liberals in the Western world respond strongly only to care/harm
and fairness/cheating but their WEIRD perspective (Western/Educated/Industrial/RichDemocratic) is at odds with not only conservatives
but also with most of the rest of the world.
6. Conservatives and people in more traditional societies feel the pull
of all six foundations with the specific strength of the tug of each ulti47
mately set by learning and culture.
Haidt and colleagues believe the six foundations of morality arose because they met specific adaptive challenges for early humans. Accordingly, humans come into the world with a moral mind in which genes
4
have "writ[ten] the first draft into neural tissue, beginning in utero" 8 but
49
that is later revised by experience and culture. The foundations of morality or "functionally specialized mechanisms which work together to
50
solve recurrent adaptive problems quickly and efficiently," describe
what we cognitive developmentalists call schema or generalized
knowledge structures. To all too briefly summarize a complex and compelling theory, the six foundations include:
1. Care/harm: The ability to feel the pain of others and be distressed
by it is rooted in mammalian attachment systems and responsible for
empathy, compassion, caring, and kindness.

46. JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY
POLITICS AND RELIGION (First Vintage Books ed. 2013).
47. Summarized by VozzoLA, MORAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 67.
48. Graham et al., supranote 2, at 8.

49. Id.
50. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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2. Fairness/cheating: The tendency to notice and appreciate fair
dealings and be outraged by cheating lies at the root of our contemporary
ideas of trustworthiness, rights, and justice.
3. Liberty/oppression: Haidt and colleagues describe peoples' deepseated resentment towards anyone who tries to dominate them or restrict
their freedom. Such animosity towards tyrants and bullies motivates people to band together to resist them.
4. Loyalty/betrayal: The feeling of oneness with our group or tribe,
arising from our ancestors' need to form coalitions, is now manifested in
religious ceremonies, sporting events, and war.
5. Authority/subversion: According to Haidt, obedience to authority
rose out of the long primate history of hierarchical societal interactions
such as dominant alpha males and submission gestures. He also sees it
contributing to human's deference to legitimate authority and respect for
traditions.
6. Sanctity/degradation: This most problematic foundation for
many liberals was originally shaped by our highly adaptive innate disgust towards things that might sicken, kill, or contaminate us (for example, dead bodies, ulcerating rashes, rotted food). Haidt argues that this
intuitive response to pathogens in our physical world now underlies religious (as well as secular humanist) ideals of living in nobler, less carnal
ways.5 1
In sum, Haidt holds that the first principle of moral psychology should
read: "Intuitions come first, strategic reasoning second." 52 Woolley suggests this finding implies that lawyers will prefer one ethical theory over
another largely due to individual prioritizations of the moral foundations
set by family, culture, and life experiences. 53
In terms of the big ideas of psychology, MFT clearly rides the crest of
the need to incorporate evolutionary and biological explanations, to
widen the domain to cross-cultural findings, and to explain the ease with
which humans morally disengage. Although siding with those critics who
believe Haidt overstates his case for the primacy of intuition, I find his
argument for evolutionarily pre-attuned moral foundations and their
evolutionary roots a compelling one. If law students wish to understand
the moral beliefs and behavior of themselves, their clients, and their adversaries, it seems important to be aware of how often people respond to
situations with intuitions rather than reason.

51. Adapted from Vozzola's synopsis of material from Haidt's website, books and articles. See VOZZOLA, MORAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 66-71.
52. Id. (quoting Haidt, supra note 2, at 315).
53. Woolley, supranote 21, at 181.
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Although Haidt and colleagues present a convincing argument, many
critics believe the emphasis on intuitionism overlooks the important role
of reason in everyday life. 54 They charge that Haidt overreaches his laboratory data and ignores the large body of research on ways in which
both intuition and reasoning inform mature moral functioning, a point
argued especially cogently by Darcia Narvaez.55 Ideally, legal education
trains students to identify emotional and intuitive responses or ideas
that cannot stand up to the light of reasoned argument. Professors, especially in professional responsibility courses, attempt to inculcate the
habit of mature moral reflection-for example, catching oneself when reacting to clients with disgust without understanding the circumstances
that brought them to this place in their lives.
Thus, a major limitation of MFT for professional ethical formation centers on the fact that it does a fine job describing System 1 thinking, but
fails to acknowledge that education and maturity, as well as the demands
of professional ethics, call for the cultivation of System 2 reasoning. In
contrast, Hamilton and Monson argue that although the Four Component Model can encompass moral intuitions, its thrust remains in "developing capacities to make sense of complex moral situations."56 A law student may respond to a moral problem with an intuitive resistance or
conflict but that initial response can then be explored through developmentally appropriate discussions and assignments. Ultimately, as Hamilton and Monson note, "if the resulting tension prompts reflection, deliberation, or more full taking into account the emotions surrounding the
conflict, the outcome may improve, morally."5 7
V. CONCLUSION: PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR PROFESSIONAL TRAINING

What conclusions might we now reach about how much of a role actual
conscious reasoning and deliberation plays in moral decisions and consequent actions and whether Rest's FCM can stand up to the challenge of
Haidt's MFT? The major argument against replacing the FCM with the

54. An entire special issue of the flagship journal of moral development presented
Haidt's 2012 Kohlberg Memorial Lecture followed by responses (mostly taking a critical
stance) from prominent moral psychologists and philosophers. See Bruce Maxwell, Moral
FoundationsTheory and Moral Development and Education, 42 J. MORAL EDUC. (SPECIAL
ISSUE) 271 (2013). Other thoughtful critiques include: T. Jacobs, My Morals areBetter than
Yours, MILLER-MCCLUNE 68-70 (Mar./Apr. 2012); Darcia Narvaez, Moral Complexity: The
FatalAttraction of Truthiness and the Importanceof Mature Moral Functioning, 5 PERSP.
ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 163 (2010).
55. See Narvaez, Moral Complexity, supra note 54.
56. Hamilton & Monson, supra note 27, at 148.
57. Id.
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MFT rests on the charge that Haidt overreaches his evidence. He is correct in his contention that humans often rely on fast, fallible, and often
emotional System 1 thinking or intuition. However, a central goal of both
undergraduate liberal arts education and professional graduate education is to learn how to cultivate the habits of System 2's more deliberative
and rational thinking.
Thus, despite the on-going conceptual problems with the moral motivation component, it seems entirely appropriate to base a professional
educational intervention on the Four Component Model (FCM) precisely
because the goal of legal education is to turn out students who "think like
lawyers" and lawyerly thinking would be a sad phenomenon indeed if it
were largely emotional rather than primarily rational. Additionally,
there is already a rich and rigorous body of work on curricular design and
assessment that could be modified to best fit a law school's mission and
goals.58
But the second part of this Article's argument proposed that we would
do students a real disservice if we do not also help them to understand
both the evolutionarily pre-attuned propensity to make rapid, intuitive
evaluations heavily influenced by cultural norms described by Haidt and
colleagues and our dark and dangerous capacity for moral disengagement
described by Bandura. Ideally then, legal ethics courses would not only
provide knowledge and practice in formal ethical guidelines but also a
rich immersion in the theories and applications of moral development.
What then should be the ultimate goal of moral development? I
think it needs to be something much more than Kohlberg's concept of
complexity in reasoning, or Hoffman's of mature empathy, or Haidt's
of tolerance for multiple worldviews and moral foundations. I believe
the goal should be one that is rarely mentioned in the literature and
equally rarely reached without a great deal of life experience and the
inevitable suffering that is part of all lives. My hope . .. is that the goal
[we] strive towards is wisdom-human goodness/care/empathy filtered
through complex moral thinking.59

&

58. See Hamilton, Monson & Organ, Empirical Evidence, supra note 27; Bebeau
Monson, Guided by Theory, supra note 20.
59. VozzoLA, MORAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 158.
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